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OIL DEVELOPMENT IN ANWR: THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IS COMPATIBLE
WITH THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE’S
STATUTORY MANDATE
Trisna Tanus
Abstract: The potential for oil production in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge (ANWR) coastal plain, otherwise known as the 1002 Area, is significant,
with a current value of $770 billion. Yet, there are considerable knowledge gaps
and disagreements over the environmental impacts of oil development in ANWR.
The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) manages ANWR and is tasked with
advancing the refuge’s mission of ecological conservation. Before it can approve
oil development in ANWR, the FWS is statutorily required to ensure that oil
development is compatible with ANWR’s mission. This Comment argues that the
precautionary principle is embedded within the laws governing FWS
management of ANWR. Simply, the precautionary principle is “foresight
planning,” in that it demands proactive prevention of potentially serious threats
to human health and the environment. Therefore, until sufficient scientific
information demonstrates oil development is compatible with ecological
conservation, the FWS must proceed with caution and prohibit oil development
in ANWR’s 1002 Area.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The debate over whether to drill for oil in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) provokes fierce ethical,
moral and political passions. 1 In recent years, this debate has
1. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1370, AN EVALUATION OF THE SCIENCE
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intensified as a result of significant increases in gasoline prices
and continuing instability in oil-rich countries of the Middle
East. 2 The total amount of oil available in ANWR is
considerable. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates
that the mean technically recoverable oil in ANWR is 7.7
billion barrels. 3 As a comparison, the United States currently
uses approximately 7.0 billion barrels per year. 4 With oil prices
currently at $100 per barrel and increasing, oil development in
ANWR will likely yield much more than $770 billion. 5
In sharp contrast to ANWR’s great potential for oil
production, ANWR is the largest national wildlife refuge in
this country and accounts for 19.3 million acres in the Alaska
North Slope region. 6 Home to an astounding abundance of
plant and animal life, this refuge includes calving grounds of
the porcupine caribou, migration paths of tens of thousands of
birds and insects, snow dens and birthing places of threatened
polar bears, and all-year activities of sheep, oxen, and
wolves. 7 For instance, the porcupine caribou herd, numbered at
129,000, moves annually from south of the Brooks Range in
the Arctic Refuge and Canada to give birth to their young on
the arctic coastal region. 8

NEEDS TO INFORM DECISIONS ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CHUKCHI AND BEAUFORT SEAS, ALASKA 1 (Leslie Holland-Bartels & Brenda
Pierce eds., 2011) [hereinafter U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY].
2. M. LYNNE CORN, MICHAEL RATNER & KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (ANWR): A PRIMER FOR THE
112TH CONGRESS 1 (2011), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/167865.pdf [hereinafter CRS PRIMER]. The
CRS issued an updated version of this report in 2012. The 2012 report is largely
similar to the report on which this Comment relied. Due to differences in pagination,
this Comment cites the 2011 report. The 2012 report can be found online. M. LYNNE
CORN, MICHAEL RATNER & KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (ANWR): A PRIMER FOR THE 112TH
CONGRESS (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33872.pdf.
3. Id. There is a possibility that economically recoverable oil is as much as 10.7
billion barrels.
4. Id.
5. Mia Bennett, After Years of Waiting, Shell Oil Drillships Poised to Explore Arctic
Alaska, ALASKA DISPATCH, June 2, 2012, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/afteryears-waiting-shell-oil-drillships-poised-explore-arctic-alaska.
6. ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: COORDINATING A
CONSERVATION SYSTEM THROUGH LAW 190 (2003).
7. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 2.
8. U.S FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PROPOSED OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT ON THE ARCTIC REFUGE COASTAL PLAIN: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES OF CONCERN 13 (2001),
IN THE
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This Comment opens by explaining the circumstances that
allow oil development to take place in ANWR. ANWR, like
other parts of the wildlife refuge system (“the System”), is
managed by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). 9 Although
conservation is the top-tier use for ANWR, 10 oil exploration
and drilling are allowed in ANWR’s coastal plain, known as
the “1002 Area,” if authorized by Congress. 11
Next, it describes the discord around the sufficiency of
scientific information available to evaluate the environmental
repercussions of oil development in this region. 12 Although oil
has been in production for many years in Arctic Alaska, a
USGS report on energy development in Arctic Alaska found
gaps in scientific knowledge that led the USGS to question
whether there is sound basis upon which to make decisions
regarding oil development in the region. 13 For example,
various sources predict totally disparate effects of oil
development on the porcupine caribou. 14

http://library.fws.gov/Pubs7/arctic_oilandgas_impact.pdf [hereinafter FWS POTENTIAL
IMPACTS].
9. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006). Under current law for FWS management of national
wildlife refuges (16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006)) and Alaskan refuges (43 C.F.R. § 3101.5-3
(2012)), an activity may be allowed in a refuge only if it is compatible with the
purposes of the particular refuge and the refuge system holistically. Many past bills
proposed to open the 1002 Area for energy activities—none has passed to become
law—bypassed the compatibility issue by stating that energy development is
concluded to be compatible with ANWR’s purpose at the refuge’s establishment and no
further decisions is required. See CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 25.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006).
11. Id. § 3143; Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, PL 96-487,
December 2, 1980, 94 Stat 2371 [hereinafter ANILCA] (This Act expanded the Arctic
Wildlife Range by 9.2 million acres and renamed it ANWR. ANILCA section 702(3)
designated 8 million acres of the original Range as a wilderness area. In section 1002,
the remainder 1.5 million acres Coastal Plain was excluded.).
12. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 1.
13. Id. On March 31, 2010, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar asked the USGS to
“conduct an initial, independent evaluation of the science needs that would inform the
Administration’s consideration of the right places and the right ways in which to
develop oil and gas resources in the Arctic OCS, particularly focused on the Beaufort
and Chukchi Seas.” Id.
14. The porcupine caribou is an example of a species whose fate in the presence of
oil development is unclear. The FWS states that one of several potential impacts to the
porcupine caribou herd from oil development—pipelines, roads, and structures—is a
significant reduction in the amount and quality of food resources during and after
calving. FWS POTENTIAL IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 13. The Congressional Research
Service’s (CRS) recent report on ANWR acknowledges inconclusive findings of impacts
to the porcupine caribou. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 16-17. On the other hand,
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The sections that follow elucidate the roles of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the FWS with respect to
oil development in ANWR. Although NEPA’s objective is to
prevent damage to the environment, 15 NEPA cannot fill the
gap created by insufficient scientific knowledge. 16 The FWS, in
its responsibility for ANWR’s management, is charged with
evaluating whether oil development is compatible with
ANWR’s mission of ecological conservation. 17 This is known as
the compatibility test. 18
Finally, this Comment contends that the FWS’s statutory
mandate and its compatibility requirement embody the
precautionary principle, and accordingly, the FWS’s
compatibility decisions should be grounded in the
precautionary principle. The precautionary principle is
“foresight planning.” 19 It requires actors to be proactive in
preventing significant harms to human health and the
environment. 20 With the current insufficiency of scientific
knowledge about the effects of oil development in ANWR, a
FWS compatibility test that is based on the precautionary
principle will yield a more environmentally sound decision
than a decision not based on the precautionary principle. At
this time, the FWS should proceed cautiously and deny oil
development in ANWR’s 1002 Area in order to achieve
ANWR’s
goals
of
“conservation,
management,
and . . . restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources
and their habitats.” 21

proponents of oil development in the 1002 Area claim that there will be no negative
impact to the caribou. ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, Top Ten Reasons to
Support ANWR Development, http://www.anwr.org/ANWR-Basics/Top-ten-reasons-tosupport-ANWR-development.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Top Ten
Reasons to Support ANWR Development]. They point to the growth of the Central
Arctic Caribou Herd that migrates directly through the Prudhoe Bay oil field (the
Central Arctic Caribou Herd has grown from 5000 animals in the early 1970s to well
over 66,000 animals today). Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4332 (2006).
16. See infra pp. 247–54.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2006); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM USES, SERVICE MANUALS, 603 FW 2 (2000), available at
http://www.fws.gov/policy/603fw2.pdf [hereinafter FWS MANUAL].
18. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 112.
19. Robert V. Percival, Who’s Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 21, 23 (2006).
20. Id. at 22.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2006).
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THE CONDITIONS AND MEANS THAT ALLOW OIL
DEVELOPMENT IN ANWR

Refuges such as ANWR may be put to a variety of uses. 22
Conservation is ANWR’s dominant purpose, as dictated by the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA),
but other uses have legitimacy in ANWR. 23 ANILCA requires
that the FWS develop a mandatory comprehensive unit plan
and manage the refuge according to a defined hierarchy of
purposes. 24 A second federal statute, the 1997 National
Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act (Improvement Act),
also governs the use of ANWR’s lands. 25 The Improvement Act
builds upon the hierarchical framework of ANILCA,
prioritizing three levels of use, from highest to lowest priority:
(1) conservation; (2) wildlife-dependent recreation; and (3)
other uses. 26 Oil development resides in the lowest position in
this hierarchy and faces additional tests of compatibility and
affirmative contribution. 27
ANILCA also designates all of ANWR, except for the 1002
Area, as wilderness area. 28 In not designating the 1002 Area as
wilderness, Congress avoided deciding to either allow
development or extend further protections of this region. 29
Instead, Congress included a provision in ANILCA requiring
studies of all of the resources of the 1002 Area. 30 Meanwhile,
ANILCA barred any energy development absent Congressional
authorization. 31
A.

Oil Development is One of the Refuge System’s Designated
Uses
Oil development, as an economic use of natural resources,

22. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4) (2006).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006).
24. Id.
25. National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat.
1252 (1997) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee (2006)).
26. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 93.
27. Id.
28. ANILCA § 1003; 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (2006).
29. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 4–5.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006).
31. Id. § 3143.
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inhabits the lowest place in the hierarchy of designated uses of
the wildlife refuge system. 32 Although less preferable than
other uses of the System, oil development is properly permitted
in the System when: (1) it is compatible with the System’s
primary use; (2) it does not conflict with secondary uses; and
(3) it positively affects a primary use. 33 In 2001, some type of
oil or gas exploration or development activity took place in
twenty-two states, with forty-five wildlife refuges in fifteen
states actually producing oil or gas. 34
Mineral resource development in the System generally
occurs where the federal government leases its own subsurface
oil and gas rights. 35 The Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
manages the issuance and extension of leases. 36 Through lease
stipulation, these lessees are required to follow regulations
that ensure adherence to the System’s conservation
mission. 37 The FWS, as the agency with control over lands
dedicated for wildlife conservation, possesses comprehensive
power to manage oil development.38
B.

ANILCA did not Designate the 1002 Area Coastal Plain as
Wilderness

In 1960, a secretarial public land order established the nine
million acre Arctic National Wildlife Range (the Range). 39 The
Range encompasses the extremely valuable and controversial
coastal plain. 40 The federal government retains control over
the land and beds underlying navigable and tidal waters,
which encompasses the coastal plain. 41 This area of the Range
was separated from the unreserved public lands in 1957, thus
placing it off limits for selection of state lands under Alaska’s

32. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 93.
33. Id. at 193.
34. Id. (citing U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-64R, U.S. FISH
AND WILDLIFE SERVICE: INFORMATION ON OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM (2001)).
35. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 193.
36. Id. at 197.
37. Id. at 194.
38. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.5-1 (2011).
39. See Pub. Land Order 2,214, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598 (Dec. 9, 1960).
40. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 190.
41. Id.
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statehood statute. 42 The 1960 establishment document
permitted oil and gas leasing in the Range. 43
In 1980, ANILCA added 9.2 million acres to the Range and
renamed it the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. 44 Most of the
original national wildlife range was designated as wilderness,
though 1.5 million acres of coastal plain were excluded. 45 Areas
designated as wilderness must be left unimpaired for future
use, preserved in their wilderness state. 46 As such, wilderness
areas are completely precluded from oil development
activities. 47 However, because the coastal plain of ANWR was
not designated as a wilderness area, oil exploration and
drilling could potentially occur in that area. In fact, Congress
labeled most of the coastal plain as the 1002 Area in order to
arrange for a special study on the future leasing of oil and gas
therein. 48 ANILCA prohibits “leasing or other development
leading to production of oil . . . from the range” unless
otherwise authorized by Congress.49
The Congressionally ordered resources study of the 1002
Area was completed in 1987 by the Secretary of the Interior. 50
Known as the 1002 Report or the Final Legislative
Environmental Impact Statement (FLEIS), the Secretary
documented potential uses of the 1002 Area, ranging from total
availability of the 1002 Area for oil and gas exploration and
development (alternative A) to wilderness designation
(alternative E). 51 The Secretary recommended alternative

42. Id. Because Alaska entered the union in 1959 and the area covered by the Arctic
National Wildlife Range in 1960 had been segregated from the unreserved public
domain since 1957, this segregation explains why Alaska does not have control of the
beds underlying navigable and tidal waters to the state.
43. Id.
44. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2374 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006)).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006).
46. Id. § 1131.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 3141.
49. Id. § 3143.
50. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE,
ALASKA, COASTAL PLAIN RESOURCE ASSESSMENT: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FINAL LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT (1987), available at
http://library.fws.gov/Pubs7/ANWR_coastal_LEIS.pdf [hereinafter FLEIS].
51. Id. at 102.
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A. 52 However, because ANILCA prohibits leasing and other oil
development activities, the 1002 Area is currently managed as
specified in alternative D (maintenance of status quo) until
Congress directs otherwise. 53
III. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF POTENTIAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS FROM OIL
DEVELOPMENT IN ANWR IS INSUFFICIENT
The production of oil in Arctic Alaska has been ongoing for
many years, including in the Nation’s largest oil field at
Prudhoe Bay, located just west of ANWR’s 1002 Area. 54
Despite years of proximate oil activities, there is considerable
divergence of opinion regarding the adequacy of available
scientific information to evaluate the environmental effects of
oil development in ANWR’s coastal plain. 55 Disagreements
abound on what science is necessary, whether the right
information is being collected, what scientific issues need to be
addressed, and the status of the body of scientific information
for those issues. 56 Independent reports, including the USGS
report, Congressional Research Service Primer for the 112th
Congress, and FWS publications, have analyzed the state of
scientific knowledge surrounding oil development and readily
acknowledge discrepancies of opinions and data.57 For
instance, the USGS report states that “[t]here are areas of
significant scientific research that form a sound basis upon
which to make decisions; there are areas where additional
science is needed; but there also is an area in which more than
science is needed.” 58
A.

Oil Development Proponents: advances in technology and
safety adequately minimize adverse environmental effects
from oil development

Oil development proponents claim several new technologies
reduce the environmental footprint of oil development
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 97–100.
Id. at 102.
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. passim; see also CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, passim.
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 221.
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activities in the harsh and changing Arctic environment. 59 One
of these advances is a reduction of operational area. 60 New
drill bits and fluids enable a less intrusive method of lateral
drilling. 61 This drilling type produces “designer” wells that
allow a horizontal reach far beyond the footprint of the drill
platform. 62 The current record for a designer well reaches
seven miles in radius, compared to the current industry
standard for down-hole operations in Alaska at five miles. 63
Proponents claim the relatively small footprint of the surface
well pad, coupled with the larger horizontal reach of the
designer wells, lessens the environmental impact from oilrelated operations. 64
Another improvement is in ice-based transportation
infrastructure. 65 In the exploratory phase, ice pads are about
ten acres in size. 66 These relatively small pads are unstaffed
and feasible when linked to bigger pads that provide housing,
storage, maintenance facilities, airfields, and other support
functions. 67 Oil companies have also made improvements in
response to changing climatic conditions, such as warming
trends, which have shortened the utility of ice roads and pads
and require instead the use of gravel structures. For example,
some companies maximize the utility of ice roads and pads by
using “two drilling rigs, rotating rigs at drill sites, starting ice
road construction from both ends simultaneously, using

59. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 14.
60. Id. Operational area of oil drilling includes above ground drillsite or pad and the
below ground down-hole operation. Id. The drillsite or pad contains the drilling
platform, rigs, equipment, storage, airfields, and other production infrastructure. Id.
In 1970, for a down-hole operation, a drill site was about sixty-five acres above ground
and reached approximately two miles in diameter underground. Id at Figure 6. In
comparison, in 1999, a down-hole operation drill site was about thirteen acres above
ground and reached approximately eight miles in diameter underground. Id.
61. Id at 14.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 13–14.
65. Id. at 14.
66. Id. Ice pads are drillsites made of ice, instead of the typical gravel. Id. Utilizing
ice pads eliminates or reduces construction of gravel pads, which inherently leave
greater environmental impact. Id. Ten-acre ice pads are considered small; in
comparison, a modern Conoco-Phillips Alpine development located west of Prudhoe
Bay, containing two pads, a connecting road, and an airstrip, totals 100 acres. Id.
67. Id. at 14–15.
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aircraft to reach remote sites, and prepositioning equipment
and materials.” 68 Tasks can then be accomplished faster
during the shorter winter season, 69 lessening the length and
extent of disruption to the Arctic environment.
In the course of planning for its oil exploration and
development in ANWR, Shell, for example, responds to
environmental concerns by gathering information that could
help predict what it would encounter from nature.70 Shell
hired a team of hydrologists, soil experts, and oceanographers
to study the Arctic environment and the feeding and migratory
habits of wildlife. 71 For instance, after Shell’s consultants
discovered that walrus calls stopped each time a seismic
survey (firing of sound and impulses through the water) was
conducted, Shell began studying how to muffle some of the
noise from drilling operations. 72 Shell is also mapping
migration patterns of sea mammals tagged with tracking
devices in order to plan its exploration activities with as little
impact as possible. 73 Moreover, in an effort to understand the
effect of an oil spill in the Arctic, Shell uses underwater gliders
to collect real time maps of currents. 74 These maps along with
oceanography studies of underwater fronts will provide data of
where spilled oil is likely to end up. 75
Some Native people, such as the Alaska Natives (Inuit),
support companies like Shell in their efforts to open energy
development in ANWR. 76 They argue that oil development can
be carried out without harming the environment, including
avoiding damage to the porcupine caribou herd. 77 They
reference the central arctic caribou herd that is found
68. Id. at 15 (“The Alpine Development Example”).
69. Id.
70. Steven Mufson, Proposed Oil Drilling Off Alaska Coast Prompts Studies of
WASHINGTON
POST,
Aug.
22,
2011,
Environmental
Impact,
THE
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/proposed-oil-drilling-off-alaskacoast-prompts-studies-of-environmental-impact/2011/08/02/gIQAO6vsWJ_story.html.
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id. The report also said, “Repeated disruptions of vocal communications could
potentially affect the maintenance of mother-pup bonds and herds’ integrity . . . Both
rely almost exclusively on calls to remain in contact when separated by larger
distances.” Id.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id.
76. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 16.
77. Id.
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seasonally in the oil fields area of Prudhoe Bay. 78 This herd of
caribou has increased significantly in numbers.79
Although oil-related activities will always present an
element of risk, companies like Shell argue that technological
progress in equipment and infrastructure and sound practices
based on scientific information adequately minimize the
potential for adverse environmental impacts from oil
exploration and drilling in ANWR. 80 Oil companies want to
convince their critics and governmental agencies that their
recent research and their commitment to ongoing research are
enough and they can drill safely with minimal environmental
impacts. 81
B.

Oil Development Opponents: too many unknowns and
potential impacts from oil development

Environmental organizations contend “[s]cience, not politics,
needs to guide decision-making in America’s extreme, remote,
and fragile Arctic Ocean. If we are to avoid irreparable harm to
an ecosystem found nowhere else in the country, we need to
develop a comprehensive research and monitoring plan and set
aside significant areas for protection.” 82 Moreover, the Pew
Environment Group (Pew), a conservation organization with a
stated mission of saving and protecting the natural
environment and its inhabitants, contends these same harsh
environmental conditions make avoiding, containing, or
cleaning up an oil spill very difficult. 83
Unknown effects of oil development are also a concern. Pew
criticizes any oil activity in the Arctic for lack of scientific
understanding of the environmental effects.84 Pew points out
that ice seals, polar bears, bowhead whales, and other marine
mammals make their homes in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas

78. Id.
79. Id.; Top Ten Reasons to Support ANWR Development, supra note 22.
80. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 15.
81. Mufson, supra note 70.
82. Marilyn Heiman, Science Must Guide Offshore Arctic Conservation,
PEW
ENVIRONMENT
GROUP,
Oct.
6,
2011,
Development,
THE
http://www.pewenvironment.org/news-room/opinions/science-must-guide-offshorearctic-conservation-development-85899364957#.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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of the 1002 Area, a setting not found anywhere else in the
United States. 85 These animals have adapted to the area’s
extreme conditions of sub-zero temperatures, high winds, and
shifting ice plates. 86
Pew’s stance to halt any oil development in the Arctic
because of inadequate information is echoed by many other
organizations, scientists, and independent experts. 87 Entities
such as the Ocean Conservancy, the Sierra Club, Defenders of
Wildlife, and the Center for Biological Diversity hold similar
beliefs. 88 Pew and the Ocean Conservancy asked scientists of
various specializations for an assessment of the 2011 USGS
report, discussed below. 89 Although Pew’s resulting
commentary praised the USGS assessment as thorough,
thoughtful, unbiased, and structurally clear, it identified areas
of incompleteness, such as historical context, identification and
dissemination of recent and ongoing research, and setting
research priorities. 90
Pew’s report points out that many scientific knowledge gaps,
major and minor, were identified, but faults the USGS report
because it did not rank its recommendations by importance in
order to help guide policymakers and other decision-makers.91
Thus, according to Pew, the USGS report represents a “good
start” 92 because it identifies necessary improvements in data
collection and synthesis, which in turn can form the basis “for
crafting a long-term, broad-scale monitoring program that is
needed for almost all of the identified issues revolving around
energy development impacts.” 93 Ultimately, Pew concludes
that oil development should wait for further scientific
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Arctic Shell Game: No Spill Plan, No Problem—Feds Say Just Drill,
EARTHJUSTICE, Sept. 29, 2011, http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2011/arctic-shellgame-no-spill-plan-no-problem-feds-say-just-drill.
88. Id.
89. PEW ENVIRONMENT GROUP & OCEAN CONSERVANCY, AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW
OF USGS CIRCULAR 1370: “AN EVALUATION OF THE SCIENCE NEEDS TO INFORM
DECISIONS ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHUKCHI
AND BEAUFORT SEAS, ALASKA” (Robert B. Spies ed.) (Aug. 28, 2011),
http://www.pewenvironment.org/uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/USGSReport-Review-Sept2011.pdf.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 7.
92. Id. at 29.
93. Id. at 19.
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knowledge. 94
C.

Government Reports Show Scientific Uncertainty and
Lack of Knowledge

As the debate over energy development in ANWR continued
in Congress, the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
prepared a primer to provide background information on the
contested issues. 95 The CRS report acknowledges that the crux
of the debate lies in the divergent opinions as to whether an
intrusion on ANWR’s ecosystem can be justified. 96 The CRS
primer points out that the debate about energy development in
ANWR has been ongoing for over fifty years, but the sharp rise
in energy prices in current years has intensified this
controversy. 97 Substantively, this report confirms the widely
divergent perspectives about oil development in ANWR. On
one hand, development advocates assert that “ANWR oil could
be
developed
with
minimal
environmental
harm,
and . . . development could be limited to a total of 2000
acres.” 98 Conversely, environmental advocates claim that
“intrusion on this ecosystem cannot be justified on any
terms . . . [and] development would be widely scattered, with
irreparable impacts.” 99
Meanwhile, with approval of oil activities in the Arctic seas,
the Secretary of the Interior asked the USGS to summarize
existing key scientific data, develop a process to figure out
where knowledge gaps are, and give preliminary advice on
what research is required to improve decision-making for outer
continental shelf energy development in the Chukchi and
Beaufort Seas near ANWR. 100 The USGS was tasked with
addressing four topics: “climate change considerations, marine
mammals and seismic activities, oil-spill response, and
cumulative impacts.” 101 The USGS team examined available

94. Id. at 31.
95. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, passim.
96. Id.
97. Id. at i.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 1.
101. Id. at 3.
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literature, including hundreds of reports, workshop findings,
policy publications, web sites, and science journals, and
engaged forty-six entities in an inclusive effort to understand
the science gap and sufficiency. 102
The USGS’s initial analysis of public policy documents
confirmed the variation in what are considered “science gaps”
and what constitutes “sufficient science.” 103 “Interpretation of
concepts are [sic] dynamic, tied to an individual’s or
organization’s held beliefs, and what they most strongly value
within their thought process when dealing with complexity
and uncertainty.”104 Moreover, the multiple layers of federal,
state, local, and regional organizations and communities that
have differing perspectives on the degree of required scientific
data only exacerbate the situation.105
According to the USGS, “[t]here is no ‘silver bullet’” to
address the critical gaps of scientific knowledge in the
Arctic. 106 But, it believes its recommended strategic actions
should commence to better support decision-making. 107 The
USGS promotes a transparent process to balance “tradeoffs
associated with ‘inaction until more information is in hand’
versus ‘action not sufficiently informed’” for evaluating the
impacts and challenges of the emerging Arctic oil
development. 108
The USGS identified key recommendations crucial to
informed decision-making. 109 These include:
 Conduct more research on the effects of climate
change on storms and ocean circulation, as they are
critical to the safety of oil development.
 Gather 3-D seismic data to better understand
geological history of the area and its oil potential.
 Improve
understanding
of
the
physical
oceanography, like circulation processes and wind for
oil-spill modeling, oil-spill response, and cleanup
efforts, noting that the physical understanding of the

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217.
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Arctic Outer Continental Shelf is not comparable
with the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf.
 Continue to research the impact of noise on marine
mammals and how overall ambient noises vary
seasonally and spatially; large uncertainty still exists
even with multiple studies conducted.
 Require evaluation of all relevant data and
formulation of guidelines, best practices, regulations,
and policies, including ongoing monitoring to
understand changes in the ecosystem and its health.
 Continue facilitating the gathering, integration, and
sharing of data to understand the Arctic as an
interdependent system and the cumulative impacts
of human activities. 110
Therefore, although some valuable information has been
compiled, including identification of key information gaps, the
USGS report highlights the extensive gaps in knowledge about
the environmental impacts of oil development in the Arctic. 111
IV. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
Some might argue that the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) can adequately protect against environmental
injuries in ANWR. NEPA advances two purposes: first, to
prevent damage to the environment; second, to educate
decision makers of the environmental impact of their
decisions. 112 The instrument through which NEPA meets its
stated intentions is the Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS for all

110. Id. at 217–21.
111. The USGS evaluation illustrates how little is known about the environmental
impacts of oil development in the Arctic region. The sources used in the USGS further
suggest that little is known about the environmental effects of oil development in the
Arctic region. The USGS’s report is not specifically about oil development in ANWR’s
1002. Rather, it discusses development in the Arctic’s Beaufort and Chukchi Seas
Outer Continental Shelves. Furthermore, in discussing anticipated impacts to the
porcupine caribou, for example, the FWS refers to the 1987 FLEIS findings. See FWS
POTENTIAL IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 4. This suggests that no scientific study more
comprehensive or recent has been done regarding oil development in ANWR.
Therefore, scientific knowledge of environmental impacts on 1002 Area oil
development, versus the Arctic generally, may be lacking even more than stated in the
USGS report.
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4332 (2006).
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actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” 113 Oil development in ANWR clearly requires
the preparation of an EIS. However, NEPA is a procedural
mandate that does not dictate the level or type of information
federal agencies must consider in their decision-making
process. Therefore, NEPA does not solve the problem of
insufficient knowledge.
A.

NEPA’s Environmental Impact Statement

The EIS serves NEPA’s “action-forcing” objective by
requiring that federal agencies take a “hard-look” at available
evidence and fully consider detailed information about
environmental impacts. 114 The EIS requirement “inevitably
bring[s] pressure to bear on agencies to respond to the needs of
environmental quality.” 115 This mandated process focuses the
agency’s attention on the effects of the action on the
environment so that vital impacts are not overlooked,
underestimated, or discovered after the action and/or resources
have already deployed. 116 Further, the publication of an EIS
serves to give the public the assurance that the agency has
studied and contemplated the environmental impacts; creates
an opportunity for public comment; and offers affected entities
notice of the expected consequences. 117 And when there is an
“irretrievable commitment of resources,” the analysis in the
EIS has to be site specific.118
An important component of an EIS is the discussion of
mitigation measures. 119 NEPA requires agencies to thoroughly
explore and document “any adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented” 120 and a reasonable discussion on possible
mitigation measures to counter these effects. 121 Without such

113. Id. § 4332(C).
114. Northern Alaska v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2006).
115. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (citing
115 CONG. REC. 40,425 (1969)) (referring to the strong precatory language of NEPA
§ 101).
116. Northern Alaska, 457 F.3d at 975.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 975–76 (citing Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988)).
119. Id. at 352 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1987)) (CEQ definition of mitigation).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii) (2006).
121. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989).
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preparation regarding mitigation, NEPA’s “action-forcing”
function is undermined and thus, “neither the agency nor other
interested groups and individuals can properly evaluate the
severity of the adverse effects.” 122 But, although a reasonable
study of mitigation steps is mandated through a “hard-look” of
the environmental impacts, there is no requirement that a
complete mitigation plan is drafted and enacted. 123 This
reasonableness standard is consistent with NEPA’s reliance on
mechanisms
of
procedure
rather
than
substantive
regulations. 124
B.

NEPA’s Procedural Limitations When There is Scientific
Uncertainty

As a major action that is expected to significantly affect the
environment, oil development in ANWR will likely trigger
NEPA’s EIS requirement. However, NEPA is solely a
procedural directive, and case law suggests that NEPA will not
fill existing gaps in scientific knowledge.
In National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 125 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that preparation of an EIS
is required where there are effects that are highly uncertain or
have unique or unknown dangers to the environment. 126 The
purpose of an EIS is to avoid speculation and confirm that
available data is gathered and analyzed before the action is
allowed. 127 Thus, although there is a lack of scientific
knowledge about the environmental impacts from oil
development in ANWR, an EIS will still be required before oil
development can commence.
NEPA, however, does not oblige an agency to make a “worst
122. Id. at 352.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 353.
125. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001) (The
Park Service was required to prepare an EIS under NEPA, rather than an
environmental assessment (EA) that resulted in a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI), for the fact that the increase of cruise ships into the unique, important
environment of Glacier Bay is a “major Federal action . . . [that] significantly affects
the quality of the human environment” even in the presence of great scientific
uncertainty and controversy.).
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.
1988).
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case analysis” in its EIS, even if it is unable to reasonably
assess a proposed action’s environmental impact. 128 In
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 129 the United
States Supreme Court concluded that although the worst case
rule was admittedly more demanding, NEPA favors a “hard
look” and public disclosures, rather than a highly speculative
emphasis on harms. 130 As in Methow Valley, an EIS for oil
development in ANWR is not required to contemplate a worst
case scenario where human or machine failure causes
catastrophic environmental injuries.
The Northern Alaska v. Kempthorne131 court defined a “hard
look” by an agency as one that “‘consider[s] all foreseeable
direct and indirect impacts’ . . . [and] should involve a
discussion of adverse impacts that does not improperly
minimize negative side effects.” 132 The hard look requires
agencies to consider the environmental impacts of all stages of
a process, and any later plans for actual exploration and
development by lessees is reviewable before the action can take
place. 133 But, agencies are not expected to delay decisions until
all environmental effects are understood. 134 Moreover, courts
will be highly deferential to agency decisions, reviewing them
under the “arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or

128. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 333 (1989)
(discussing the amendment to CEQ regulations removing the worst case requirement
in EIS analysis; NEPA does not require that uncertainty in predicting environmental
damage be tackled solely by a worst case analysis).
129. Id. (In consideration of whether the Forest Service, faced with scientific
uncertainty, was required to make a “worst case analysis” and a fully developed
mitigation plan in its EIS, the Supreme Court held that the Forest Service was not so
required and NEPA simply requires agencies to summarize “existing relevant and
credible scientific evidence and an evaluation of adverse impacts based on generally
accepted scientific approaches or research methods.”).
130. Id. at 334.
131. Northern Alaska v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2005) (Where plaintiffenvironmental organization claimed that the EIS analysis for an action to make the
entire Northwest Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NWPA) available for oil and gas leasing
should have been site specific since there were legitimate concerns of uncertainty of
adverse consequences that future development may cause, the court pointed out that
concerns of uncertainty of future actions are inherent in any program of natural
resources development and thus, plaintiff’s assertion that the agency violated NEPA
fails at this juncture but can be raised at the exploration and permit stages of the
leasing program.).
132. Id. at 975 (quoting Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957,
963 (9th Cir. 2002)).
133. Id. at 977 (see 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(c)).
134. Id. at 977 (quoting North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 600 (1980)).
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otherwise not in accordance with the law” standard.135 As
such, under the “hard look” mandate, mitigation plans for oil
development in ANWR—those based on utilization of best
technologies or those that respond to actual conditions—must
be considered by FWS, but under Kempthorne the FWS need
not perform field tests or implement mitigation plans in order
to be in compliance with NEPA.
NEPA also requires that an EIS include a detailed
statement of alternatives to an agency’s proposed action. 136
This alternatives requirement attempts to ensure that the
most optimal decision will be made.” 137 But, NEPA does not
require that every possible alternative be considered by the
agency so long as it has an explanation for eliminating that
alternative. 138 As the CRS Primer explains, the precise location
of oil in ANWR is unknown. 139 Alternative methods of oil
development, such as changing drilling methods, platform
locations, and infrastructure design, are likely to be numerous
and highly divergent. In turn, each variable changes the
expected environmental impacts. Although NEPA’s goal is to
ultimately achieve the best decision, 140 here, NEPA compliance
may mean that the selected option will result in more adverse
environmental impacts than other available alternatives.
Additionally, in Sierra Club v. Marita, 141 the court held that
“NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process.” 142 Although the agency is
135.Id. (citing Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208,
1211 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(2006))).
136. Id. at 978 (see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2006)).
137. Id. at 978 (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States
Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
138. Id. at 978 (citing Westlands Water District v. United States Dep’t of the
Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 871 (9th Cir. 2004)).
139. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 22.
140. Northern Alaska, 457 F.3d at 978.
141. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995) (Plaintiff, an environmental
organization, sued the Forest Service to enjoin timber harvesting, road construction,
and creation of wildlife openings for the Service’s failure to consider certain ecological
principles of biological diversity. Although the court found biological diversity should
be further explored, the science in general “had not been applied to forest management
in the Lake States,” thus, the court held that the Forest Service was not required to
apply conservation biology in its environmental analysis under NEPA.).
142. Id. (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989)).
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required to look at and disclose foreseeable impacts to the
environment from the proposed alternatives, “NEPA does not
require . . . an EIS [to be] based on the best scientific
methodology available, nor does it require resol[ution of]
disagreements among various scientists as to methodology.” 143
The Marita court deferred to the agency’s chosen scientific
method. In this recurring theme of deference to agency’s
decisions, for oil development in ANWR the FWS has
discretion to choose the science it wishes to follow because
NEPA is a procedural law. To comply with NEPA, the FWS is
not required to attain a defined level of information prior to
evaluating the environmental impacts of oil development.
Thus, NEPA cannot fill the gap when there is a lack of
knowledge.
V.

THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE MANAGES
ANWR

The FWS manages ANWR as part of the System’s public
lands classification. 144 In addition, ANILCA imposes special
rules on ANWR’s management that require the FWS to
prepare a comprehensive refuge unit plan and delineate tiers
of purposes. 145 Federal law allows oil exploration and drilling
in ANWR’s coastal plain, the 1002 Area, with the approval of
Congress. 146 Following such approval, the FWS must then
determine if oil development is compatible with the refuge’s
higher-tiered purposes and contributes to the System’s
conservation mission. 147 This is known as the compatibility
test. 148

143. Id. at 623 (quoting Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d
976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32
F.3d 1346, 1359 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that responsibility of the court “is to ensure
that the Forest Service’s procedures resulted in a reasoned analysis and disclosure of
the evidence before it”).
144. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006).
145. Id. § 3101.
146. Id. § 3143.
147. Id. § 668dd.
148. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 112.
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ANWR is Part of the Wildlife Refuge System Under the
Public Lands Classification

Congress delegates the power to make rules and implement
policy to land management agencies such as the FWS and the
National Park Service. 149 For ANWR, this power is given to the
FWS through the Improvement Act. 150 This entrustment of
authority allows Congress to avoid entanglement in the
details. 151 The FWS, with its particular expertise, can adapt
quickly to changing situations. 152 The Supreme Court has
consistently held that Congress’ broad power over public lands
goes beyond the rights of a regular, private owner and federal
preemption trumps all conflicting state laws. 153
The System occupies a notable place in the public land
classification in that its dominant purpose is nature
protection. 154 During the past four decades, economic, political,
and social forces shaped many land classifications, including
the System, into accommodating multiple uses rather than a
single-purpose, exclusive use. 155 These forces also influenced
the System to accept other uses alongside its promotion of
ecological values. 156 Currently, federal public lands’ dominant
use systems consist of the national parks and the national
wildlife refuges. 157 The System is comprised of acquired and
reserved lands that are primarily managed by the FWS. 158
The System is comprised of two major categories:
coordination areas and refuges. 159 States manage coordination
areas under cooperative agreements or leases from the FWS. 160
Coordination areas are also excluded from comprehensive
planning and compatibility determination requirements
149. Id. at 16.
150. National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111
Stat. 1252 (1997) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee (2006)).
151. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 16.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 16 (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1967)).
154. Id. at 19.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 21.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 25.
160. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol2/iss2/4

22

Tanus: Oil Development in ANWR: The Precautionary Principle Is Compatibl

352 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:2

arising from the Improvement Act. 161 Refuges, however, are
managed by the FWS through strict adherence to mandates of
the Improvement Act. 162
There is at least one unit of refuge in every state. 163 Alaska
holds eighty-five percent of the System’s acreage in four
percent of refuge units. 164 ANWR sits at the top of the list of
giant refuges with 19.3 million acres. 165 The System’s purpose
of wildlife conservation is apparent in its support of more than
700 bird, 220 mammal, 250 reptile and amphibian, and 200
fish species, including a total of 180 animal and 78 plant types
listed under the Endangered Species Act. 166
The System accommodates many other uses and brings in
approximately 37 million visitors each year. 167 Significant
wildlife-dependent recreation, such as hunting, fishing,
wildlife observation, and environmental education, occurs in
the System. 168 Nonwildlife-dependent recreation, such as
boating, swimming, and camping, is also common. 169 Further,
economic uses like logging, commercial fishing and trapping,
and mining, along with their requisite rights-of-way for roads,
pipelines, and other utilities, occur with regularity.170 Not
surprisingly, conflicts arise between these uses and the
conservation mission of the System.
B.

The Mandates of ANILCA and the Improvement Act

ANILCA imposes additional administrative and managerial
requirements on the FWS in its management of ANWR. 171
First, the FWS must prepare a comprehensive refuge unit
plan. 172 A comprehensive refuge unit plan requires the FWS to
engage in full-scale, complete refuge planning. 173 Second,
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006).
FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25, 30.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006).
Id. § 668dd(e)(1)(A).
Id.
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ANILCA establishes a hierarchy of purposes to which the FWS
must adhere when managing ANWR. 174
1.

ANWR’s Comprehensive Refuge Unit Plan

A comprehensive refuge unit plan must explain the natural
and cultural significance of the refuge, define areas suitable for
access and use as administrative facilities, and identify
problems that may result in adversities for the populations
and habitats of fish and wildlife. 175 Providing a basic roadmap
to meet the refuge’s goals, ANILCA mandates that each Alaska
refuge has a “comprehensive conservation plan” (CCP) that
addresses four substantive elements:
 Designate areas within the refuge according to their
respective resources and values;
 Specify programs for conserving fish and wildlife,
and other special values, to be implemented within
each area;
 Specify the uses within each area that may be
compatible with the major purposes of the refuge;
and
 Set forth those opportunities that will be provided (if
compatible with refuge purposes) for fish and
wildlife-oriented recreation, ecological research,
environmental education, and interpretation. 176
These four planning elements are the only substantive
statutory management requirements for the contents of a
CCP. 177 Taken together, they force the FWS to look ahead at
how to zone the refuges in order to achieve its goals, anticipate
future actions, and incorporate public input. 178 The original
CCP for ANWR was signed into effect in 1988. 179 The FWS is
now midway through a two year undertaking to revise the
1988 CCP. 180 Cautionary in nature, these planning mandates

174. Id.
175. Id. § 668dd(e).
176. Id. § 668dd(e)(2).
177. Id.
178. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 55.
179. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, Revising the Comprehensive Conservation
Plan (CCP), http://arctic.fws.gov/ccp.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
180. Id.
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contain proactive measures that look to survey future
conditions towards the refuge’s goals.
2.

ANWR’s Designated Uses

Although there is general agreement that conservation is
the top-line use for refuges, disagreement still exists over what
other uses have legitimacy in the System. 181 For Alaskan
refuges, ANILCA’s tiering system controls subordinate uses
with statements of intent such as “to the maximum extent
practicable” and “in a manner consistent with [higher priority
conservation purposes].” 182 In 1997, the Improvement Act built
upon ANILCA’s tiering system when the Act constructed three
basic tiers, from highest to lowest: 1) conservation; 2) wildlifedependent recreation; 3) other uses for all refuges in the
System. 183
ANILCA permits subsistence uses, 184 which are accorded a
high priority, allowing for displacement of other uses. 185
Subsistence uses are unique in ANWR because in Alaska,
hunting and fishing are neither fully recreational nor fully
commercial; they include customary uses by rural Alaskan
inhabitants for direct consumption as food, shelter, fuel,
clothing, tools, or transportation, and for indirect consumption
such as barter or sharing. 186 Subsistence use allowance is
limited only by public safety, administrative, and conservation
limitations, 187 though the FWS acknowledges these constraints
can be very broad and subject to the agency’s discretion. 188 The
FWS affirms that administrative limitation may be employed
to safeguard the refuge’s purposes and to responsibly manage
the refuge. 189
As an economic use, oil development occupies the lowest
rung of designated uses in ANWR. 190 In order to be permitted,
oil development must be compatible with ANWR’s primary
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 89.
16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006).
FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 89.
16 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (2000).
Id. §§ 3112(2), 3114.
Id.
Id. §§ 668dd(a)(3)(C), 3126(b).
FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 185.
Id.
Id. at 93.
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use—conservation—and secondary uses such as subsistence. 191
VI. THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE’S
COMPATIBILITY TEST
The FWS possesses statutory authority under the
Improvement Act to require uses in national wildlife refuges,
like ANWR, to be compatible with the refuge’s dominant
use. 192 This means that the Secretary “shall not initiate or
permit a new use of a refuge or expand, renew, or extend an
existing use of a refuge, unless the Secretary has determined
that the use is a compatible use and is not inconsistent with
public safety.” 193
A.

The Compatibility Test

The Improvement Act requires the Secretary to issue
regulations to “maintain the biological integrity, diversity, and
environmental health of the National Wildlife Refuge System
for present and future generations of Americans.” 194 Uses that
may conflict with the maintenance of ecological integrity are
not compatible. 195 The FWS regulates permitting of proposed
uses on refuges by administering its compatibility test.
1.

The Refuge Manual

In order to promulgate a consistent compatibility evaluation
that satisfies the System’s mission of conservation, the FWS
prepared and published a Refuge Manual. 196 The manual
specifically requires a compatibility test for all refuge uses and
their associated facilities and improvements. 197
The manual provides guidelines for making a compatibility
test. 198 It lists all information required for making a
compatibility decision. Among the items in this list are: the

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 193.
16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006).
Id.
FWS MANUAL, supra note 17, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
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name of the refuge and its purpose(s), detailed description of
the proposed use (action), the resource requirements of
administration and management of the use, anticipated
impacts from the use, public comments, and what stipulations
are necessary to confirm compatibility. 199 In each step of the
compatibility test—from the preparation of the description and
assessment of impacts of the proposed use to the professional
review of the issues involved with that proposed use—a wealth
of information and scientific data are needed to fulfill the test’s
objective.
2.

The Role and Responsibilities of the Refuge Manager

Refuge managers are tasked with determining whether
proposed or existing uses are subject to the compatibility
requirements. 200 If the use is required to be compatible, the
refuge manager must determine whether that use is
compatible. 201 The refuge manager is required to document all
determinations in writing. 202 In addition, the refuge manager
must ensure that the FWS provides a forum for the public to
review and comment on compatibility determinations. 203
Through the FWS Director’s delegation, refuge managers
have the authority to make compatibility determinations. 204
Because of the complexities in determining compatibility,
refuge managers are directed to consider their knowledge and
experiences of the biological resources under examination. 205
Additionally, refuge managers must “make conclusions that
are consistent with the principles of sound fish and wildlife
management and administration . . . .”
Refuge managers rely on “sound professional judgment” in
their administration of the compatibility test. 206 Using their
sound professional judgment, they must determine issues such
as whether the proposed action will materially frustrate, either
directly or indirectly, the fulfillment of the System’s mission or

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 11–15.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
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the purpose(s) of the refuge. 207 Refuge managers have to look
at tangible impacts, current or future, that affect the FWS’s
ability to fulfill the refuge’s mission and purposes. For
instance, a regulated taking of many animals from a refuge
may actually help manage and improve the health of a wildlife
population. 208 But, the removal of one animal of a threatened
or endangered species or minor harassment of a species during
critical biological times could irreparably harm the refuge’s
ability to maintain and perpetuate that species. 209 Thus, refuge
managers must be able to appropriately evaluate the types of
effects being contemplated from a proposed use. Further,
refuge managers are required to consider direct and indirect
impacts from the proposed use, including cumulative impacts,
when other existing or planned uses in the refuge or adjacent
areas are at play. 210
3.

The Compatibility Test is Refuge-Specific

In addition to using sound professional judgment in making
compatibility determinations, refuge managers base their
evaluation “on a refuge-specific analysis of reasonably
anticipated impacts of a particular use on refuge resources.” 211
In this section of the Refuge Manual, the FWS requires that
the refuge manager’s evaluation be focused and targeted to the
refuge at issue, rather than the broader system. 212 This section
again prohibits an affirmative finding of compatibility when
there is not enough information available to the refuge
manager. 213
Refuge managers utilize information from field experience
and familiarity with refuge resources, data from states, tribes,
proponents or opponents of the use, and public input. 214
Although refuge-specific analysis need not be based on refugespecific biological data, such information may be considered if

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol2/iss2/4

28

Tanus: Oil Development in ANWR: The Precautionary Principle Is Compatibl

358 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:2

the data is gathered from a similarly situated area and thus is
relevant to the inquiry. 215 Managers should also differentiate
between short-term and long-term impacts. 216 A use that may
have only minor impact on the refuge’s resources at the onset
could become cumulatively significant over time. 217
Additionally, refuge managers must be mindful of indirect
impacts that may be “reasonably associated with a specific
use” such as those that take away or divert resources away
from an activity that does contribute to the refuge’s mission.218
B.

The Failures of the Compatibility Test

Theoretically, the compatibility test for proposed uses should
curb the proliferation of incompatible uses. 219 However, the
FWS has broad discretion to choose how to implement the
test. 220 As a result, incompatible secondary uses are now
permitted in many refuges. 221 Incompatible secondary uses
that are often approved by the FWS include mining, off-road
vehicles, air boats, military exercises, waterskiing, power
boats, rights-of-way, grazing, logging, hunting, and beach
use. 222
The Des Lacs Refuge in North Dakota is an example of a
refuge that suffered as a result of incompatible use. 223 The Des
Lacs Refuge is home to wetlands and migratory birds, but is
also a popular destination for recreational boating. 224 The FWS
kept the water level high at the lake for recreational
boating. 225 As a result, the FWS could not manage the

215. Id.
216. Id. at 13.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 58. A report by the Government Accounting Office
released in 1989 documented the failure of the FWS to make changes to widespread
approvals of incompatible uses. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-89196, NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM: CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH
INCOMPATIBLE USES CALL FOR BOLD ACTION (1989) [hereinafter CONTINUING
PROBLEMS WITH INCOMPATIBLE USES CALL FOR BOLD ACTION].
220. FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 59.
221. Id.
222. Id. (citing CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH INCOMPATIBLE USES CALL FOR BOLD
ACTION, supra note 240).
223. Id. at 59.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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wetlands for the refuge’s primary purpose, which was
migratory bird production. 226 Noise from power boats and
waterskiing also unsettled the nesting activities of the birds. 227
The U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) looked into the
FWS’s management of the Des Lacs Refuge and found two
main causes for mismanagement. 228 First, the FWS allowed
nonbiological factors, such as political and economic (local
commerce) interests, to influence its approval. 229 Second, the
FWS lacked financial data on the costs of managing the
secondary recreational uses. 230
The mismanagement of the Des Lacs Refuge inspired the
hierarchy of uses in the Improvement Act. 231 After the findings
in Des Lacs Refuge, the Improvement Act was the vehicle that
strengthened the FWS’s commitment to its compatibility test
by prioritizing uses. 232 This tiering system, in part, aims to
assist refuge managers in their determination of
compatibility. 233 The Improvement Act also dictates protection
of wildlife, plants, and the environment, encouraging the FWS
to “just say no” to incompatible, nonpriority uses. 234 However,
there are real limitations to the compatibility test. For
instance, the last sentence in the Refuge Manual’s chapter on
compatibility, states: “Compatibility determinations are an
integral part of our decision about refuge uses; however, it is
important to note that compatibility is only one of many
factors that we take into account when we consider allowing or
not allowing a refuge use.” 235
C.

The Language of the Compatibility Test Declares Caution

As designed, the compatibility test is infused with caution.
Compatibility is a threshold determination on whether the

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.
FISCHMAN, supra note 6, at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 201.
FWS MANUAL, supra note 17, at 16–17.
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proposed use will “materially interfere with or detract” from
the ability to meet the System’s mission or refuge’s
purpose(s). 236 The compatibility test must evaluate the use
separately and in aggregate with other existing or planned
uses. 237 The burden of proof is on the proposer of the use. 238
For anticipated impacts of the use, refuge managers:
[W]ill use and cite available sources of information . . . .
Sources may include planning documents, . . . .
environmental
impact
statements, . . . . field
management experience and consultation with wildlife
research professionals, state wildlife resource managers
and industry professionals . . . . If available information
is insufficient . . . then the refuse manager would be
unable to make an affirmative finding of compatibility
and we must not authorize or permit the use.239
If the use is a priority public use and there is insufficient
information available, a refuge manager does not need to
generate her own data in making compatibility evaluations. 240
She is directed to work with the proponent of the use to attain
the needed information. 241 The burden to collect information
does not shift to the manager. 242 But, she should move towards
identifying the gaps in data and assist in facilitation of
information gathering. 243 In all cases, a refuge manager should
not approve a proposed use until there is an affirmative
showing of compatibility, thus eliminating the risk of
unexpected adverse impacts. 244 These protective measures
demonstrate the cautious makeup of the FWS’s compatibility
regulations.

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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VII. THE FWS SHOULD RECOGNIZE AND CARRY OUT
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE EMBEDDED IN
ITS COMPATIBILITY STATUTE AND REGULATIONS
Protective mechanisms are in place to protect against
environmental injuries in ANWR. Caution is inherent in the
prohibition on oil development in ANWR absent Congressional
approval and the FWS compatibility test for any proposed use.
This paper advocates that the precautionary principle, as
defined at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit, is already
part and parcel of ANILCA’s compatibility requirement and
the FWS’s corresponding regulations. As such the FWS should
utilize the precautionary principle in assessing potential
environmental impacts of oil development in ANWR’s 1002
Area. Because of the likely irreparable and permanent effects
on the environment from oil exploration and drilling, 245
sufficient information is critical and should be demanded.
Relying on best available science is not enough to determine
compatibility. Employing the precautionary principle ensures
that the FWS makes decisions with full comprehension of the
environmental impacts and protects ANWR’s biological
integrity and diversity, environmental health, and mission of
conservation.
A.

The Precautionary Principle Generally

The precautionary principle embraces scientific uncertainty,
which is often intrinsic to predictions of environmental
impacts. 246 At its core, the precautionary principle “cautions
that regulatory policy should be proactive in ferreting out
potentially serious threats to human health and the
environment, as confirmed by the history of human exposure
to substances such as lead and asbestos.” 247
The precautionary principle originates from the German
concept of Vorsorgeprinzip, which was developed in the 1970s
to prevent air pollution’s harm to forests. 248 When translated,
Vorsorgeprinzip means “foresight planning.” The German

245.
246.
247.
248.

FWS POTENTIAL IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 7–15.
Percival, supra note 19, at 23–24.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
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Federal Interior Ministry explained the precautionary
principle as one that “commands that the damages done to the
natural world . . . should be avoided in advance and in
accordance with opportunity and possibility. Vorsorge further
means the early detection of dangers to health and
environment by comprehensive, synchronized . . . research, in
particular about cause and effect relationships, . . . acting
when conclusively ascertained understanding by science is not
yet available.” 249 The precautionary principle was utilized by
many countries in their early environmental statutes,
beginning in the 1960s through the 1980s. 250 At the 1992
Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro, the principle, in its most
universally accepted formulation, found its most noteworthy
endorsement when 178 nations, including the United States,
signed the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development. 251 At this summit, the participating nations
agreed that “[i]n order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by
States . . . .”252
Today, there are many iterations of the precautionary
principle. The numerous versions vary in their degree of
balance and integration of scientific, economic, political, and
social values with the objective of risk management and
protection of the environment. 253 The approaches are
differentiated by the amount of risk and uncertainty necessary
as a threshold matter to trigger the principle, the weights
appropriated to competing interests and values, and the rights
and responsibilities of the pertinent party(ies) being
regulated. 254 A robust version of the precautionary principle is
one of preemption, where the burden is placed on proving that
the action is not harmful or when the activity is banned

249. Id. at 24 (citing NORA MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR
POLLUTION IN THE COMMON LAW STATE 11 (2003)).
250. Percival, supra note 19, at 24.
251. Id. at 28.
252. Id. (citing United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
de Janiero, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 1, Principle 15 (Aug. 12, 1992)).
253. Phillip M. Kannan, The Precautionary Principle: More Than a Cameo
Appearance in United States Environmental Law?, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 409, 418 (2007).
254. Id.
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altogether. 255 At this extreme end, the cost of being
precautious is paralysis, and critics contend that utilization of
the precautionary principle deprives society of benefits,
eliminates opportunities for innovation, and may carry other
substitute risks. 256 A more balanced precautionary approach is
one that was embraced at the Rio de Janeiro Summit. The Rio
de Janeiro Summit defined the precautionary principle as:
“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainly shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.” 257 Under this version of the precautionary
principle, the principle is invoked when identification of the
potential danger has been made and, even with objective
assessment, the risk for that danger cannot be calculated with
sufficient certainty. 258
Domestically, the United States government has used this
balanced precautionary approach more often than the
preemptive precautionary approach in addressing ecological
harms. For example, NEPA incorporates the principle in spirit
by requiring federal decision makers to be fully informed of the
environmental consequences of their decisions through the EIS
process. 259 The Clean Air Act, as another example, requires the
Environmental Protection Agency to monitor fuel additives
that “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.” 260 This differs from the Clean Air Act’s previous
language that applied regulation only for additives that “will
endanger public health or welfare.”261 In a landmark holding
in Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld EPA’s regulation in the Clean

255. Id. at 419.
256. Id.
257. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 1, Principle 15 (Aug. 12, 1992).
258. Kannan, supra note 253, at 420.
259. Sanne Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages After the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95, 122–23 (2009).
260. Id. at 122 (citing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §
401(e), 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (2006))) (emphasis
added).
261. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
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Air Act. 262 The court endorsed the precautionary approach of
the Act and explained that “[r]egulatory action may be taken
before the threatened harm occurs; indeed the very existence
of . . . precautionary legislation would seem to demand that
regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent, the
perceived threat.” 263
B.

Application of the Precautionary Principle to Proposed Oil
Development in ANWR

Oil development in ANWR has a high potential for causing
significant, irreparable, and permanent harm to a region that
supports a unique ecosystem and valuable fish and wildlife
resources, as well as to the Native people who rely on these
resources for subsistence. 264 As previously discussed, there is
intense discord among the public, governmental entities,
pertinent industry participants, and other stakeholders over
the ability to explore and develop oil safely, the environmental
consequences of oil development, and how to implement impact
prevention and mitigation plans. 265 Presently, available
science cannot adequately show the long-term effects of oil
development in ANWR.
The precautionary principle upholds the purpose and
statutory intent of the compatibility requirement as
administered by the FWS compatibility test. The basic premise
of the precautionary principle is to take cost effective measures
to minimize or avoid harm in the face of scientific
uncertainty. 266 But, not all formulations of the precautionary
principle are appropriate. The proper formulation of the
precautionary approach that should be employed here is the
balanced, risk-based, 1992 Rio de Janeiro Summit approach.
Although a preemptive precautionary approach may achieve
complete environmental protection in ANWR, such a path
veers away from the express legislative decision not to ban all
oil development in the 1002 Area. Such an extreme approach
indeed takes away the potentially great benefits of energy

262. Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
263. Knudsen, supra note 259, at 122 (citing Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
264. CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 16–18.
265. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 2.
266. Kannan, supra note 253, at 420.
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harvest from the Arctic. The balanced application of the
precautionary principle tailors the response to the situation at
issue. For example, in the European Union’s application of this
approach “[the] response . . . developed [should] reflect[]
‘proportionality between the measures taken and the chosen
level of protection; non-discrimination in application . . . ;
consistency . . . with . . . similar situations; examination of the
benefits and costs . . . ; review of the measures in the light of
scientific developments; [and] the burden of proof.’
[It] . . . stresses science and requires judgments based on
individual risks.”267
Three elements comprise the precautionary principle: “[1]
fully assessing possible impacts of an action; [2] shifting the
burden of proof to those whose activities pose a threat to the
environment; and [3] not acting if there is significant
uncertainty or risk of irreversible harm. The first two elements
are procedural, and the third is substantive.” 268 Applying these
three elements, the FWS can make informed decisions about
oil development in ANWR and fulfill both its overarching
purpose of environmental protection and ANWR’s conservation
mission.
1.

The FWS Should Evaluate the Full Suite of Potential
Impacts From Oil Development in ANWR

The first element of the precautionary principle requires
evaluation of environmental impacts. 269 This element promotes
attentiveness to environmental consequences. 270 The FWS
compatibility test is an actual application of this element. In
its Refuge Manual, the FWS requires its refuge managers to
identify and describe all reasonably anticipated impacts of the
proposed use. 271 They are directed to consider and use
“available sources of information, including planning

267. Id. at 419 (citing Activities of the European Union: The Precautionary Principle,
EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/consumer_safety/l32042_en.htm
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (summarizing a February 2000 communication from the
Commission of the European Communities on the precautionary principle)).
268. Kannan, supra note 253, at 422–23.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. FWS MANUAL, supra note 17, at 9–10.
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documents, environmental assessments, environmental impact
statements, annual narrative reports, information from
previously conducted or ongoing research, data from refuge
inventories or studies, published literature on related
biological studies, state conservation management plans, field
management experience and consultation with wildlife
research professionals, state wildlife resource managers and
industry professionals, etc.” 272
Moreover, refuge managers have to evaluate long-term and
short-term impacts from the proposed use. 273 The Refuge
Manual cautions that a use may be expected to result in minor
effects at the beginning, but over time these effects may turn
into substantial adversities. 274 Impacts may also be short in
duration but highly damaging to the environment, or
conversely, long in duration but with very minor effects.275
There is a lack of large-scale synthesis of data addressing
quantitative and cumulative effects of changes from oil
development in the Arctic environment. 276 As discussed above,
the USGS team pinpointed several crucial elements that must
be achieved prior to making decisions about oil development in
the Arctic. 277 The FWS, by law and its own regulations, is
required to assess the full suite of impacts when considering a
proposed use. If the FWS follows a precautionary model when
there is insufficient information, as is the case with ANWR’s
1002 Area, the FWS should direct its refuge managers to deny
oil development as a proposed use. 278
2.

The FWS Should Demand Proof of Compatibility from
Proposers of Oil Development

The second element of the precautionary principle deals
with who has the burden of proof and what level of proof is
required. 279 A balanced precautionary principle accommodates
the goals of compatibility; consideration of the action within

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, passim.
Id. at 3.
FWS MANUAL, supra note 17, at 7.
Kannan, supra note 253, at 424.
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the actual context should guide how the second element is to
be applied.
Oil development in ANWR has the potential for
irretrievable, materially adverse consequences to the
environment on a large scale. 280 Oil spill risk and response
strategies in the harsh, yet fragile Arctic setting lack evidence
of proven success acceptable by a majority of stakeholders. 281
Because of the potential for extreme environmental injury and
uncertainties in adaptive management, a correspondingly high
level of proof showing adequate environmental protections
should be demanded. The burden of proof to show expected
environmental impacts from oil development should be on the
proponent’s shoulders. This showing must be supported by
evidence of reasonable scientific certainty accepted by the
general stakeholders’ community. Adaptive management
plans, including accountability for oil spill risk and response,
must also be confirmed by evidence of scientific certainty when
enacted in the real life conditions of ANWR.
Consistent with the precautionary principle, the FWS’s
compatibility test places the burden of proof on the proposer of
the action: 282
[C]ompatibility . . . is a threshold issue, and the
proponent(s) of any use or combination of uses must
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the refuge manager
that the proposed use(s) pass this threshold test. The
burden of proof is on the proponent to show that they
pass; not on the refuge manager to show they
surpass. 283
The compatibility test also addresses the potential for
significant environmental damage from oil development by
requiring refuge-specific analysis. 284 Like the precautionary
principle’s reasonable scientific certainty requirement, FWS
refuge managers are required to base their evaluations on
reasonably anticipated impacts on refuge resources. 285
For proposed oil development in the 1002 Area, refuge
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 16–18.
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 109.
FWS MANUAL, supra note 17, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 13.
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managers should consider impacts to all of ANWR’s ecological
resources, including, for example, the porcupine caribou herd.
FWS refuge managers may look at planning documents,
environmental assessments, and other previously conducted or
ongoing research and studies 286 from comparable locations,
such as the USGS report 287 or the biological studies of the
central caribou herd condition in light of its migration through
the Prudhoe Bay oil fields. 288 The 1987 FLEIS findings, though
from many years ago, and the FWS’s own documented
knowledge also provide a pertinent basis for the refuge
manager’s examination. In the porcupine caribou case,
although these sources of information may be reasonable, they
provide opposing viewpoints on oil development’s impacts to
this species and cannot be said to be generally accepted by the
stakeholder community. Therefore, to begin the compatibility
test, proposers of oil development in the 1002 Area must make
available comprehensive and cumulative information on
potential environmental impacts from oil development. This
includes, for instance, the possible impact on the porcupine
caribou if oil pipelines, roads and structures are built on the
herd’s calving grounds, as drawn from reasonable, generally
accepted scientific data. The refuge manager needs this type
and level of information to properly administer ANWR’s
ecological resources and implement its mission of conservation.
Without this information, FWS refuge managers cannot make
an affirmative finding of compatibility and must not permit oil
development in ANWR. 289
3.

The FWS Must Prohibit Oil Development in ANWR if
Faced with Insufficient Scientific Information

The third element of the precautionary principle bars the
proposed action from occurring when there is substantial
uncertainty or risk of irretrievable harm. 290 Elasticity is built
into interpretations of “substantial uncertainty,” “substantial
risk,” and “irretrievable harm.” 291 For this present case, much
286. Id.
287. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, passim.
288. See Deborah Jacobs, The Caribou Question, PERC REPORTS, June 2001, at 3,
available at http://perc.org/perc-reports/volume-19-no2-summer-2001.
289. See FWS MANUAL, supra note 17, at 9, 13.
290. Kannan, supra note 253, at 426.
291. Id.
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can be argued as to the whether the oil development in ANWR
meets the threshold of any or all of these categories. The USGS
report that consulted over 400 sources of information readily
admitted difficulty in “determining what is a ‘science gap’ or
what is ‘sufficient science.’” 292 Tasked with summarizing
existing information, the USGS team identified many major
gaps in scientific knowledge, including insufficient information
for “effective oil-spill risk assessment, preparedness, and
response” despite the “significant advances in spill-risk
evaluation and response knowledge.” 293
Technological innovations have arguably lessened the
footprints of oil development. 294 Oil companies continue to act
preemptively in their research efforts to meet their
legislatively and self-imposed missions to act carefully and
responsibly. 295 Therefore, the risk of catastrophic disaster may
be slight. However, given the history of injuries from oil
development, little argument can reasonably be offered to
assert that damages from oil development are only temporary
or easily repairable. The grounding of the Exxon Valdez
supertanker on March 24, 1989 released eleven million gallons
of crude oil into one of this world’s most fragile and amazing
marine environments, causing an oil slick of over 500 miles
and damaging 1300 miles of shoreline. 296 The cleanup cost over
two billion dollars, while the livelihood, social, and cultural
fabrics of fishing and Native communities were torn apart. 297
Twenty years after the spill, the Pacific herring and the Pigeon
Guillemot are identified as species that have “not recovered,”
meaning they show little or no signs of improvement. 298 As a
result of the BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico
on April 20, 2010, BP paid out an additional $7.8 billion on top

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 13–14.
Id.
Knudsen, supra note 259, at 95 (citing EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE
COUNCIL,
2009
STATUS
REPORT
4
(2009),
available
at
http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/NOAA_related_docs/oil_spills/2009%20Status
%20Report%20(Low-Res).pdf) [hereinafter TRUSTEE COUNCIL, 2009 REPORT]; see also
Questions and Answers, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL,
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/qanda.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
297. Knudsen, supra note 259, at 96.
298. Id.
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of the $7.5 billion it already spent to further compensate the
thousands of people injured and damage to the environment. 299
An oil spill in the 1002 Area would likely devastate ANWR’s
delicate ecosystem richly filled with wildlife and migratory
birds, including the porcupine caribou herd, polar bears, musk
oxen, eagles, snow geese, and many others, and which supports
Native people’s subsistence uses.
Even without an oil spill, oil development has significant
impacts on the environment. According to the USGS, oil
reserves in the 1002 Area may be located in small
accumulations throughout the 1002 Area, in contrast to
Prudhoe Bay’s single large oil field. 300 The nearest pipeline
would be more than 30 miles away and the nearest gravel road
and oil support facilities more than 50 miles away, requiring
many production sites connected by even greater number of
infrastructure build-outs. 301 The FWS expects adverse
cumulative impacts on biological life in the refuge as the result
of oil development. 302 For the porcupine caribou, oil
development will potentially reduce the quality and quantity of
food and habitat available during the herd’s calving season. 303
The FWS predicts that a reduction in annual calf survival of
just five percent would cause a decline in the porcupine
caribou population. 304
When evaluating proposed oil development in ANWR, the
FWS should recognize the precautionary principle within its
own statute and regulations. The FWS is tasked to consider
complex factors of environmental risks while understandably
distracted by economic, political, and Native concerns. The
FWS must demand sufficient information to perform a true
compatibility test. Accordingly, given the current state of
scientific knowledge and consistent with the precautionary
principle, the FWS should deny a proposal to initiate oil
development in ANWR.

299. John McDonnell, BP Agrees £4.9 Billion Settlement Over Gulf of Mexico Oil
Spill, METRO, Mar. 3, 2012, http://www.metro.co.uk/news/892043-bp-agrees-4-9billionsettlement-over-gulf-of-mexico-oil-spill-disaster#ixzz1xBAGHQb9.
300. FWS POTENTIAL IMPACTS, supra note 8, at 7.
301. Id. at 8.
302. Id. at 7–8.
303. Id. at 14.
304. Id.
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VIII.CONCLUSION
When evaluating proposed oil development in ANWR’s 1002
Area, the FWS should follow the precautionary principle in
order to conform to the stated and implied goals of the
management of ANWR, the conservation purpose of the
System, and the agency’s own mission to protect human health
and the environment. The precautionary principle, already
embedded in FWS compatibility statute and regulations,
assists the decision makers by demanding the requisite
amount of time and assignment of efforts to obtain the
appropriate level of certainty and knowledge. In addition, the
precautionary principle obligates the proposer of the actions to
be responsible for disproving the action’s harm or potential
harm on the environment. Until sufficient information
demonstrates oil development’s compatibility with ecological
conservation, as its own regulations require, 305 the FWS must
proceed with caution and prohibit oil development in ANWR’s
1002 Area.

305. Id. at 8.
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